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Will I -- well I look at this and I go again I go back to.
The regulators are hard are what -- are that are running behind their their fault they're trying to KR whenever they aren't.
There's no doubt about it and I think it's important -- and point good committed independent people -- these jobs it's important for congress to to not.
Put pressure on them on banks command -- is coming in and say you know put pressure on the regulators they need to be -- they need to be respected but they also need to be independently -- -- for the country.
But if -- the Smart financial person I can make couple million dollars -- and -- of a bank and I work I work for you guys -- make a 100012.
It is all about money and means you do you want people look I think we should pair expects our examiners very well.
That the people you want to draw to government service expense and a job like this -- hopefully not the kind of people that money is everything to them -- if that's their culture -- mindset that shouldn't Examiner's.
That's not what that's not the kind of person in my record -- -- To talk about Larry Summers Larry Summers was.
And a variety of positions in Washington but you talk about the fact that you had that he misrepresented your FDI.
Actually did -- found -- about that later actions I was researching the book.
He had -- the president had been talking about doing you know wide scale foreclosure prevention.
McCain had to was a big issue in the campaign so we thought we were unable to get the push people to move ahead.
And so we thought we would get change and Larry Summers was the main person on it.
And he ended up doing a program that that bush economists in the church -- department had device which we'd argued to Hank Paulson against tank had not.
Watched it because we didn't it was gonna work it was says it was it was chairman it would didn't provide enough incentives it was horribly complex.
And he went -- did that he he rejected our program.
You reject lot of other programs so they were out there there were much more aggressive but he we were wet into discussions so well enjoy I think until March.
And then I find out in December he had written an email.
To the president that has said that our program.
Didn't work as a high re default rates at which was just not true there were no we default rates on our program we just started -- -- in effect for couple months of zero they re default rate was zero -- I was astonished that one he would misrepresent the program without doing maybe I'm an estimate -- as did his homework but.
I have lots of emails from -- -- -- his folks saying they re default rates -- zero.
And then to keep leading us in discussions without telling us that they were gonna do our program I don't understand why did that I don't I think that it's not -- professional.
I have to I have the feeling that -- your book.
It's good to great read died I mean.
If you really gets into I think it's more or more drama and here's -- -- from -- that maybe you intended effect but.
The whole idea about -- in the first place yeah.
Where you -- less current thinking is supposed to be sorry -- -- for it or were you for what we originally were sold which was we're gonna go get those toxic assets and basically take those bad loans off the banks' books and we never did.
Right answers so we did not initiate -- we weren't really involve a consultant with TARP until they couldn't get it passed they came back to us they raise the deposit insurance limits to get to.
More votes to get it done.
We weren't opposed to it but we said and I have they email selected to Hang -- that we got in terms of what our exposure was -- -- banks that we could handle it received proposals of how we would do it.
And you know of the chart for the non bank -- in the sector outside the insurance and so we you know that could be for bad -- that they wanted to do but looking -- -- -- -- in the -- in terms of needing capital.
The only institution and I really saw -- was insolvent was was with city and the rest of them I could have -- -- they needed some liquidity support that for capital.
And most of didn't pay it back right away it was it was expensive for the healthy ones it was expensive.
The truth is -- Canadian all need help.
Not not to apple know there was say you have to distinguish between whether you're insolvent I think most of them had been able to all of them except for Citi have been able to.
Access nongovernment sources of capital.
Last question what are we do we have as much risk were worse or better what today.
I think we have more cap on.
Banks which is get -- think we have more stable liquidity funding which is good to add that we have huge risk on the horizon I think -- -- in the mother bomb bomb bubbles over the some very protracted very aggressive monetary policy again as with the best of intentions and I think.
There's series of her films that are risk involved.
Europe it continues to be a potential source of instability so I think.
The risk are substantial going for the sector some better shape that typically mistress of their very much.
Sheila -- this great it's great book it's very Gromit -- I don't know.
A history book didn't think -- is -- again thank you.
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